Jamming techniques require only moderate resources to be deployed, while their effectiveness in disrupting communications is unprecedented. In this article, we introduce several contributions to jamming mitigation. In particular, we introduce a novel adversary model that has both (unlimited) jamming reactive capabilities as well as powerful (but limited) proactive jamming capabilities. Under this adversary model, to the best of our knowledge more powerful than any other adversary model addressed in the literature, the communication bandwidth provided by current anti-jamming solutions drops to zero. We then present Silence is Golden (SiG): a novel anti-jamming protocol that, introducing a tunable, asymmetric communication channel, is able to mitigate the adversary capabilities, enabling the parties to communicate. For instance, with SiG it is possible to deliver a 128-bits-long message with a probability greater than 99% in 4096 time slots despite the presence of a jammer that jams all on-the-fly communications and 74% of the silent radio spectrum-while competing proposals simply fail. Moreover, when SiG is used in a scenario in which the adversary can jam only a subset of all the available frequencies, performance experiences a boost: a 128-bits-long message is delivered within just 17 time slots for an adversary able to jam 90% of the available frequencies. We present a thorough theoretical analysis for the solution, which is supported by extensive simulation results, showing the viability of our proposal.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications are prone to several kinds of attacks due to the shared nature of the radio channel. Jamming is one of the most effective denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that might be performed in such a scenario [Richard 2003 ]. Jamming is a general term that refers to several disruptive radio activities aiming either to interfere with or to prevent communications. While jamming originated in the military scenario, it is currently a threat to civilian communications as well [Richa et al. 2012] . There are two main reasons for the widespread diffusion of jamming as a DoS attack in the wireless scenario: the first one is its effectiveness; the other is that its implementation does not require specialized hardware. For instance, a cheap WiFi radio can be instructed to Authors' addresses: R. Di Pietro, Bell Labs, Route de Villejust, 91620 Nozay, France; G. Oligeri, Department of Mathematics and Physics, University of Roma Tre, Largo San Leonardo Murialdo, 1, 00146 Roma, Italy. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies show this notice on the first page or initial screen of a display along with the full citation. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers, to redistribute to lists, or to use any component of this work in other works requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Permissions may be requested fromgenerate collisions with the on-the-fly packets so that the receiver cannot decode them [Dehghan et al. 2012] ; or, the same radio might be used to occupy the transmission channel in such a way that the transmitter cannot even start a new communication [Thuente et al. 2007 ]. In the last decade, jamming devices have evolved into high-power random noise transmitters, making jamming a serious threat for wireless communications. As an example, military equipment implements band jamming by transmittingRoadmap. Section 3 introduces our reference scenario, defining the transmitter, the receiver, and the adversary model. Section 4 presents a simplified version of the SiG protocol, which is subsequently detailed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, which introduce the frequency hopping scheme and the error correcting codes, respectively. Section 5 provides a detailed description of the SiG protocol. Section 6 shows the performance of SiG by means of a theoretical analysis and simulation results, while Section 6.3 presents the performance of the SiG protocol in the presence of an adversary model commonly assumed in the literature. Section 7 compares SiG against other recent solutions to jamming attacks. Finally, some concluding remarks are presented in Section 8.
RELATED WORK
We first review the most relevant contributions that enable radio communications via both jamming and radio silence. Later, we survey the most recent proactive and reactive anti-jamming techniques.
Communication Via Jamming and Silence
An early solution leveraging jamming as a communication means is provided by Bhadra et al. [2008] . The scenario involves 4 nodes and a slotted channel: two legitimate peers communicate to each other by transmitting messages on the shared channel, while one of the illegitimate users interferes/jams the legitimate messages. Now, the other illegitimate peer chooses a reception of "1" when a collision is detected, while choosing "0" when the slot is empty or filled up by a legitimate message. Authors proved that the status of the channel, that is, jammed or not-jammed, can be used to communicate one bit of information. Although this article introduces a breakthrough solution to communicate via jamming, it cannot be used to mitigate the jamming itself: in fact, the solution basically sets up a signaling channel by jamming a legitimate channel.
As for communicating via radio silence, Fragouli and Orlitsky [2005] and Dhulipala et al. [2006] proposed a protocol for energy-efficient communication over wireless sensor networks based on the use of silence as a means of conveying information, that is, information is inferred by the fact that nodes stay silent. Another interesting solution comes from Zhu and Sivakumar [2005] , who proposed Communication through Silence (CtS) and studied the trade-off between energy and throughput. However, note that communicating via radio-silence does not prevent the jammer to disrupt the ongoing communications: as it will be clear in the following, both proactive and reactive jammers can easily disrupt both the silence and the active radio periods. proposed I-codes that enable the protection of the integrity of messages exchanged between entities that do not hold any mutual authentication material. The construction of such codes is possible where only one kind of bit error is possible, for example, it is possible to change the value of a transmitted bit from "0" to "1," but not the inverse. Leveraging this assumption, and the fact that an adversary cannot remove or erase a signal from the radio channel, they combine an ON/OFF keying, the signal anti-blocking property of the radio channel, and finally I-coding in order to enable the receiver to detect whether the integrity of the transmitted message is violated. Perkovic et al. [2012] propose combining a visible light channel and wireless radio channel in order to address the problem of initial secure key deployment. The protocol involves two phases: devices exchanging messages to be authenticated over a radio channel and a user performing authentication via a visible light channel. This solution leverages an ON/OFF keying on a visible light channel and the fact that an adversary can only flip the value of the transmitted bit from "0" to "1," and not vice-versa.
Finally, we observe that silence periods and communications delays have also been used in covert channel communications [Li and Ephremides 2010] .
Proactive Jamming
An early analysis of the feasibility of launching and detecting jamming attacks in wireless networks is proposed by Xu et al. [2005] . They provide an in-depth study on the problem of conducting radio interference attacks on wireless networks, and examine the critical issue of diagnosing the presence of jamming attacks. They consider different adversarial models and run real test-beds to measure the adversarial performance. They show that even by using signal strength, carrier sensing time, or the packet delivery ratio individually, it might be difficult to discriminate whether a jammer is active.
Many solutions have been proposed for proactive jammers. We identify two main families: the "keyed" [Liu et al. 2011] and the "keyless" [Popper et al. 2010] ones. The former leverages a pre shared secret in order to generate frequency hopping sequences (unknown to the jammer); the latter leverages a delay between sender and receiver in order to make them converge on a shared transmission frequency. Liu et al. [2011 propose the Time Delayed Broadcast Scheme (TDBS): a broadcast communication is achieved by means of a sequence of unicast communications-sometimes assisted by proxies. The solution relies on long frequency hopping sequences that are preloaded in each sensor belonging to the network before nodes deployment. A keyless solution is presented by Popper et al. [2010] , who propose delivering a message between two peers by an uncoordinated spread spectrum technique while introducing a delay between the transmitter and the receiver in order to synch them. Finally, an early keyless solution from Baird et al. [2007] leverages specialized ultrawide band radios in order to transmit short impulses. Such a communication scheme is difficult to jam, that is, so far a radio impulse cannot be canceled with an inverse waveform. Each bit of the message is coded with a time-delayed radio impulse, nevertheless; spurious impulses (errors) might appear at the receiver side due to noise fluctuations or malicious entities, generating an increase in the computational cost that is exponential in the size of the message. Gilbert et al. [2009] provide a theoretical evaluation of a 3-player game, that is, 2 nodes that want to communicate against an energy-bounded adversary. They showed both lower and upper bounds for the broadcast delay and subsequently generalized the model to describe n-players' problems such as reliable broadcast, leader election, static k-selection, and t-resilient consensus.
Reactive Jamming
Reactive jamming involves the activity of sensing the channel and subsequently switching the radio to jamming status. As for reactive jamming, the current state-of-the-art solutions do not deal directly with the jammer, but leverage either space or temporal bounds to which the adversary is subject. Liu and Ning [2012] propose exploiting the reaction time of the reactive jammer in order to enable communication; they argue that the jamming activity needs more than t s = 1ms, radio switching needs other t c = 50μs, while the transmitter has already sent R(t s + t c ) bits-assuming a transmission rate R. Thus, the receiver collects all the bits that are transmitted by the sender but not jammed by the reactive jammer, and assembles them to construct the original message. Xuan et al. [2012] propose a combined solution that involves both locating the reactive jammer and deactivating the nodes that trigger its activity. They observe that the reactive jamming activity is particularly disruptive in dense WSNs. Indeed, the reactive jammer is triggered by a specific node, while the jamming signal will eventually prevent all the communications of the nodes in the jammer neighborhood. In order to avoid this, Xuan et al. propose a solution in which nodes cooperate to estimate the jammer position, and subsequently enforce the radio silence of the nodes that trigger the jamming activity.
Another solution to reactive jamming is POWJAM [Hamieh 2012 ]. Hamieh proposes short-distance transmissions (with low power) between peers in order to hide the transmitter from the reactive jammer. Each long-range communication turns out to be implemented by a sequence of multi-hop transmissions characterized by low-distance propagation and therefore a low probability to be sensed by the jammer.
An efficient and fair MAC protocol robust to reactive interference has been proposed by Awerbuch et al. [2008] and subsequently extended by Richa et al. [2012] . The proposed protocol is robust to both internal and external interference, requiring no knowledge of the number of participants; nevertheless, the authors bound the reactive jamming activity to a (1 − )-portion of the available time slots.
Another interesting solution comes from Vo-Huu et al. [2013] , who design, prototype, and evaluate a system for canceling the jamming signal: the system combines a mechanical beam-forming design with an auto-configuration algorithm and a software radio digital interference cancellation algorithm. The mechanical beam-forming uses a custom-designed, two-elements antenna architecture and an iterative algorithm for jammer signal identification and cancellation.
Recently, Cassola et al. [2013] proposed TREKS, an efficient and adversary-resilient secret sharing mechanism based on two novel paradigms: intractable forward decoding and efficient backward decoding. Although TREKS is four orders of magnitude faster than the work proposed by Popper et al. [2010] , it guarantees the message delivery under a power-bounded reactive jammer. As such, it is a subject to a serious drawback: the packet loss rate of TREKS reaches 100% when the signal-to-jammer ratio is less than -20dB.
Finally, a novel solution for key establishment that leverages radio silence and channel anonymity has been proposed by Di Pietro and Oligeri [2013a] . However, while being effective against a global eavesdropper, it is not resilient to the jammer model introduced in this article.
SCENARIO
We consider a wireless communication scenario consisting of a point-to-point link between a transmitter (T ) and a receiver (R) , where T wants to deliver a message m consisting of L m bits to R. We assume that m ∈ , where is a dictionary shared between T and R (note that such a dictionary could be the set of correct English words). Further, we assume that the radio spectrum consists of F different frequency bands (channels), that is, { f 0 , . . . , f F−1 }. Both the transmitter and the receiver share a preloaded secret s 0 .
Generally speaking, R could receive from T -due to the jamming activity and the radio noise-a message m , such that m = m. The SiG protocol guarantees (with a given, tunable probability) recovery of m. In the following, we assume m to consist of a few bits, for example, L m ∈ {128, 256, 512} bits-for example, m could carry commands or geographical coordinates.
Further, we assume that T and R are loosely time synchronized [Ganeriwal et al. 2008] and that time is divided into slots, that is, i ∈ [0, . . . , ∞[. Finally, we do not assume any specific or powerful hardware configuration at both T and R-the SiG protocol only needs the computation of a cryptographically secure hash function [Eastlake and Jones 2001] and the capability to run a symmetric encryption algorithm such as AES [NIST 2001] . Table I contains symbols and acronyms used throughout this article.
Transmitter and Receiver: Software and Hardware Assumptions
Transmitter. We consider a standard off-the-shelf radio transmitter such as a WiFi or GPRS/UMTS radio device. Without loss of generality, in the following we consider a proactive jamming probability n codeword length C n error correction code
symmetric decryption algorithm p J maximum jamming probability resiliency probability of successful message jamming | · | size of the bit string radio technology characterized by F = 124 different communication channels (as in the GSM-850). At each time slot i, the transmitter chooses a pseudo-random frequency
and, as detailed in the following, it decides whether to stay silent or to transmit the message m, that is, transmit(m, f i ).
Receiver. In our model, the receiver might reconstruct the transmitted message m in mainly two ways: by either simply receiving (during a time slot) the transmitted message m or, as it will be clear in the following, by estimating the energy associated with the frequency f i . In this latter case, recovering mrequires multiple time slots-one of such estimations per time slot.
We envisage a very simple receiver equipped with a radio and able to estimate the received signal strength, hereafter RSS; that is, we assume R is provided with a radio physical layer function E( f i ), which returns an average estimation of the RSS values experienced during the frequency slot f i . RSS estimation is a common feature in all radio devices in order to implement medium access control. RSS provides an estimation of the current channel energy. Note that recent papers have leveraged this information to detect the presence of a jamming signal Xu et al. 2005] , that is, when a powerful jamming attack is performed, the receiver experiences high RSS values.
Therefore, in addition to the standard receiving behavior, our receiver also senses and logs (into m ) whether the energy associated with that frequency exceeds a given threshold τ . As a toy example, let us consider . Energy detection capability of the receiver: At each time slot, the receiver translates the measured channel energy to a bit value, that is, it decides for "0" when the measured energy is under the threshold τ , "1" otherwise.
threshold τ (this is the case if there is a transmission, jamming, or environmental noise), while it sets m i = 0 if it senses only noise floor (RSS under τ ). Communicating leveraging radio silence leads to the following definition: Definition 1. We refer to slot i as a silent slot if the energy detected by the receiver on the associated frequency f i is below the threshold τ .
On the calibration of the τ value. The problem of calibrating the receiver threshold τ is out of the scope of this article. The τ value, also known as receiver sensitivity, is set by the factory producer and is a function of an upper bound on the bit error rate, the receiver noise figure, and finally the thermal noise floor. In this article, we assume such a value set to a default value [ETSI EN 300 910 ETSI EN 300 910]; as for the GSM, τ ≥ −102dBm in order to guarantee a bit error rate less than 10 −3 . We observe that the value of the τ parameter is not critical for the SiG protocol: if the detected signa-associated power is under the threshold, then it is simply not considered (noise floor). If the detected signal-associated power exceeds the threshold, the receiver tries to receive and decode the message: if it fails, it considers the received message as jammed and behaves accordingly.
Adversarial Model
We confront our solution against what, to the best of our knowledge, is the most powerful adversary presented in the literature. In particular, our adversary (J ), combines the capability of the proactive jammer, of the reactive jammer, and also network-wide eavesdropping capabilities. In particular:
-J as a global eavesdropper. It is able to eavesdrop on all the communications in the network. In order to achieve this, J might deploy multiple eavesdropping stations all over the network. Moreover, we assume each station is able to monitor the overall radio spectrum. -J as a reactive jammer. It is able to sense the ongoing communication and to jam it instantaneously, while at the same time switching between the sensing and the jamming procedures. We assume a very powerful reactive adversary: (1) it detects the communications with a theoretical zero delay; (2) it switches between the eavesdropping phase and the jamming phase with a theoretical zero delay; and, (3) it interferes (jams) with the transmissions with a sufficient power to disrupt it. Note that in considering this powerful (yet realistic) type of adversary, we assume a conservative stance as for the security of communications. To the best of our knowledge, this is the strongest adversarial configuration ever assumed in the literature for a reactive jammer. -J as a proactive jammer. At each time slot, J randomly chooses A among the F available frequencies and jams them. Therefore, at each time slot, if T is performing a transmission, J successfully jams it (whatever the transmission frequency is). Otherwise, J jams A out of the F available frequencies.
As a toy example, let us assume F = 1 and the communication scenario in Figure 2 . The transmitter sends to the receiver 4 messages and the jammer successfully jams all of them at time slots i ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7} (reactive jamming). Moreover, J generates a jamming signal during the time slot 2 (proactive jamming). Proactive jamming might appear useless in our adversarial model (all the communications are already assumed to be successfully jammed); nevertheless, as it will be clear in the following, the silent slots are important to our solution, therefore a proactive jammer has an incentive to jam them.
SIG PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the rationales of the SiG protocol; a detailed description will be provided in the following section. Let us assume that T has to transmit an 8-bits message (L m = 8), that is: m = {0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1} (Figure 1) . The transmitter implements an ON/OFF keying modulation as follows: at each time slot i with 0 ≤ i ≤ 7, if m i == 1 then T transmits the whole m, otherwise it waits for the next time slot.
As for the receiver, there can be only three disjoint cases: (1) if R correctly receives the message m (benign scenario) then it stops the SiG protocol; (2) if the RSS exceeds the threshold τ the receiver sets m i = 1; and (3) R sets m i = 0 otherwise. However, recalling Section 3.2, J (also being a perfect reactive jammer) is assumed to jam all the slots used by T to transmit the message, as well as (being a proactive jammer) a few more randomly selected slots (some of which could be silent slots). Therefore, let us consider again Figure 2 : J successfully jams the slots i ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7} as well as slot 2 (this latter one was intended by T to be a silent slot). We observe that, although all the messages are successfully jammed, after 8 time slots R is able to recover the bit string m = {0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1} that differs from m for only one bit-the silent slot (i = 2) jammed by J .
Similar to Definition 1, we define an active slot as follows:
Definition 2. Slot i is an active slot if, on the associated frequency f i , the transmitter T is carrying out an active communication by transmitting a message.
Silence is Golden. The SiG protocol interleaves silent slots with active slots-slot i will be an active one if m i == 1, a silent one otherwise. Both are fundamental for successful message transmission. In particular, while active slots carry the message (or the "1s" of the message, if the frequency f i is jammed) the silent slots carry the "0s" of the message (or an error if the frequency f i is jammed).
In the following, we show how multiple transmissions can be leveraged to mitigate the proactive jamming activity. This feature, combined with channel-idiosyncratic error-correcting code capabilities, enable the full recovery of the original message (m).
Leveraging Frequency-Hopping
In this section, we refine the baseline communication scheme introduced earlier.
As stated earlier, T and R choose in a pseudo-random fashion the current communication channel within a set of F ≥ 1 frequencies. Increasing F makes the proactive jamming of the current communication channel more difficult, since a larger F decreases the probability of J to jam the silent slots (communicating the 0s of m).
In detail, T and R implement a frequency hopping scheme [Popovski et al. 2006 ] that makes the current communication frequency unpredictable to the entities that do not share the initial secret s 0 . A few solutions have been proposed in order to generate a pseudo-random (shared) frequency starting from a shared secret. In this work, we adopt the following formula:
where H 1 (·) is a cryptographically secure hash function, for example, SHA-1 [Eastlake and Jones 2001] , i is the current time slot, s i is the shared secret at time slot i and, is the total number of available frequencies. Figure 3 shows an example of transmission of an 8-bits message. In particular, the frequency hopping sequence is constituted by
while the bits involved in the communications are m = {0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1}. Each of these frequency f i might experience one of the following three different states: silence (white box)-that is, the sender intends to send a 0; pure jamming (cross), that is, the frequency is not used by T , but it is jammed by J ; or, jammed transmission (gray box with cross). We recall that J is able to jam all the transmissions that appear in the radio channel, therefore none of the messages sent by the transmitter will be correctly received by the receiver. Nevertheless, at each time slot the receiver could still retrieve the bit message m i by assessing the status of the current frequency slot f i . In fact, when m i == 1: T transmits the message, J jams it, and finally, R detects that the RSS associated with f i exceeds τ (frequency f i has been jammed) and sets m i == 1, whereas for each m i == 0: T selects the radio channel f i but does not transmit the message. R monitors f i and 9:10 R. Di Pietro and G. Oligeri if no power is detected, decides for m i = 0. This is the case for time slots i ∈ {0, 4, 6}. However, we observe that J might jam a silent slot (frequency f i used for a silent slot is randomly selected by the jammer as well), as it happens in our example for time slot i = 2-causing a one-bit error (m 2 ) in the received sequence m .
Therefore, assuming F available frequencies and an adversary able to jam A of them at each time slot, the probability for a silent slot to be jammed (flipping a bit from 0 to 1) is given by p J =
A F
. Moreover, we highlight that, regardless of J activities, the receiver is able to retrieve at least all the 1s of the message anyway.
Binary Asymmetric Error-Correcting Codes
As stated in Section 4.1, J can always prevent the correct reception of the transmitted messages, given its perfect reactive jamming capabilities. However, R is still able to recover all the 1s of m. We stress that J cannot prevent the active communication of the 1s; the only way to achieve this is to remove the message from the radio spectrum, for example, generating an inverse waveform to have the RSS sensed by T resulting below the threshold τ . However, in the literature, this feature is considered very difficult to achieve [Baird et al. 2007] ; therefore, in the following, we will assume that such an event as impossible-that is, experiencing a bit transition from 1 to 0 has an associated probability 0. Nevertheless, J has a probability p J to jam a silent channel, that is changing the bit value from 0 to 1.
Communication channels characterized by an asymmetric probability to experience a transition between zeros and ones, such as the one just described, are called binary asymmetric channels [Klove 1981 ], hereafter BAC. In particular, BAC characterized by P(0 → 1) = p J and P(1 → 1) = 0 are called inverted Z-channels [Klove 1981 ] (see Figure 4) . The inverted Z-channel exactly describes our communication model. Most important, the error-correcting codes (ECC) specifically designed for this channel might be used to recover the error bits due to jamming over silent slots, as described in the following.
Let x and y be two bit strings (codeword) of n bits, each belonging to the code C. Let δ be the asymmetric distance, that is, the number of i s such that m i = 0 and m i = 1. Let also = min {x,y∈C,x =y} δ(x, y) be the minimum asymmetric distance. A fundamental theorem of the ECC theory [Delsarte and Piret 1981] Delsarte and Piret [Delsarte and Piret 1981] provide several constructions for asymmetric binary ECCs C n , given the codeword length n and the minimum asymmetric distance .
In the following, we adopt the most resilient configuration: the repetition code, that is, n = , that is able to correct up to n− 1 errors by repeating each bit n times. Now, let us assume a bit string m e of L m bits. In order to be resilient to n−1 consecutive jamming 
Receiver
The receiver algorithm (Algorithm 2) starts by synching with T on the new shared secret key, The receiver syncs with the transmitter on the correct frequency by means of f i = H 1 (s i | i) mod F. The receiver performs the message reception by means of m e = receive( f i ), decrypts m e obtaining m , and if the integrity check of m is successful (m ∈ ), it sets the rx variable to true (line 17). Nevertheless, our adversarial model assumes that none of the message can be received correctly, that is, J is able to jam all the active communications.
Therefore, R leverages the channel energy in order to reconstruct the transmitted message. The receiver retrieves the estimation of the energy on the current frequency slot f i by means of the radio function e = E( f i ). If the estimated energy e overcomes the threshold τ , the receiver sets m ec [i] = 1, otherwise m ec [i] = 0. Eventually, after L c time slots, the receiver first decodes the collected bits (m ec ) into the bit string m e , and subsequently decrypts m e , obtaining the message m .
Finally, the receiver checks for message integrity, m ∈ , and returns m = m if the message is correct, otherwise error (lines 33-38).
Transmitter-receiver synch. As stated before, the transmitter and the receiver are loosely time synchronized. Nevertheless, the receiver might still miss the start of the message if the first few bits are just zeros, that is, a sequence of silent slots. In order to recover the message, the receiver continuously runs Algorithm 2 and, after the very first n · L m time slots, the receiver generates a decoded message m every time slot. The integrity of the message can be verified by the receiver by checking whether Fig. 6 . The receiver continuously decodes and verifies the received messages, discarding those that do not belong to the dictionary, for example, messages that contain inactive time slots.
m ∈ (lines 33-38 in Algorithm 2). Figure 6 shows a simple example of a transmitter that starts the communication asynchronously (after one time slot) and transmits two messages (m 1 and m 2 ) interleaved with an inactive period. The receiver adopts a circular buffer that is continuously fed with the current status of the channel. After receiving the first n · L m bits, for example, at time slot t = 3 in Figure 6 , the receiver runs Algorithm 2, decoding and verifying the content of the buffer at each time slot. The receiver discards the decoded messages at time slots t = 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, . . . because they do not belong to the dictionary, that is, m / ∈ , while at t = 4 and t = 8 the messages are received, decoded, verified, and finally accepted, that is, m 4 and m 8 ∈ .
Multipath fading and signal cancellation. Generally speaking, packet loss is due to radio noise that corrupts the transmitted packets [Rappaport 2001 ]. In our communication model, the correct reception of a bit at slot i depends on the energy sensed over frequency f i . Hence, in principle it could be possible that random energy fluctuations, due to the multipath fading of the radio channel, might produce destructive interferences, causing the energy associated with the frequency f i to be below the threshold τ , eventually generating a crossover 1 → 0. However, in our reference scenario (i.e., assuming the presence of J ), we observe that our adversarial model involves a reactive jammer that (when a transmission is sensed) jams the overall network with a very powerful signal. Since the energy over frequency f i is increased by the jammer, the jammer itself makes the probability of a crossover 1 → 0 negligible. Moreover, we highlight that signal cancellation due to a jamming attack involves predicting the shape of the signal at the receiver and sending the inverted signal to the receiver to cancel it out . To the best of our knowledge, the only effective techniques to remove a signal from the radio channel requires the so-called correlated jamming, which in turn assumes the knowledge of the source signal [Shafiee and Ulukus 2005] .
Although these described cases are very unlikely, given both the physical constraints they require to be realized and our introduced model, we stress that in any case a corrupted message cannot be accepted as a genuine one. The receiver eventually checks for the integrity of the message (line 33 in Algorithm 2), and discards the message if it does not pass the check.
Wrap Up
The SiG protocol combines two key elements that make it robust to jamming: (1) frequency hopping makes the communication of the 0s unpredictable, while (2) the (active) communication of 1s cannot be prevented by J (i.e., the transmission of 1s is transparent to jamming).
We consider a simple example of the SiG protocol in Figure 7 . In order to simplify the discussion, we do not consider the encryption step, therefore the bit string m is directly Fig. 7 . An example of message transmission, jamming, and reception: the bit string m = {1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0} is encoded into the bit string m ec , subsequently transmitted into a radio spectrum with F = 5 frequencies. The jammer jams all the messages and a few silence slots flipping one or more bits (from 0 to 1). Finally, the receiver recovers the original bit string m by leveraging the error-correcting code.
encoded into the bit stream m ec . Further, we assume a code C n , such that = n = 8, and consequently able to recover t ≤ − 1 = 7 errors (see Section 4.2 for details). Therefore, the initial bit string m = {0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1} of length L m = 8 bits is encoded into the bit stream m ec of length L c = nL m = 64 bits. The communication channel consists of F = 5 frequencies: at each time slot the transmitter and the receiver sync on one of them; subsequently, either a transmission or a radio silence is performed as a function of the current value of the bit to be transmitted.
The jammer jams all the transmitted messages and (proactively) A = 1 of the F = 5 frequencies when no communications appear on the radio spectrum. We observe that J hits the 5 th , 8 th , 23 rd , 37 th , and 54 th silent slot; consequently, the bit string m ec differs from m ec by 5 bits. Nevertheless, the ECC code is able to correct up to t = 7 errors per codeword, and eventually the received message m ec allows recovery of m.
We stress that under a standard proactive adversary (i.e., an adversary that without zero probability fails to jam an active communication), the SiG protocol delivers the message m with the first not-jammed active communication, whereas, our adversary J successfully jams all the active communications. SiG thus accomplishes the correct delivery of a single bit (1) per active communication. Although J cannot prevent the delivery of the 1s, it can jam the transmission of the 0s, changing their value to 1.
SiG awareness. Knowledge of the SiG protocol does not provide any advantage to an adversary J aiming at disrupting the communications of the peers. In fact, J knows that each of the active communications carries the message, therefore it has to reactively jam all of them. As for the silent time periods, according to our adversarial model, J is a bounded proactive jammer, thus the best it can do is to randomly choose and jam A among the F available frequencies. Finally, we acknowledge that an adversary able to both proactively jam all available spectrums for a time period greater than n time slots and to reactively jam all subsequent communications does prevent the SiG protocol from delivering the message. However, such an adversary is not comprised within the adversarial model introduced in Section 3.2, and it is left for future work. Possible solutions to cope with this type of adversary involve the usage of block correcting codes Fig. 8 . Fast hopping attack to SiG: a jammer able to quickly change all the frequencies might choose to jam all the frequencies within a time slot for just a short period. [Reed and Solomon 1960] between the encryption and the ECC algorithm layer, or adopting a cryptographic interleaving code [Lin and Noubir 2005] .
Fast hopping adversary. In the following, we assume that the adversary has an advanced specific hardware configuration that allows it to swipe over all available frequencies (in a time slot) and to jam each frequency-jamming requiring a short but not null period of time. A simple example of the effects of this new attacking capability is depicted in Figure 8 , with F = 5. Let us consider the transmission of two bits: the 0 with a silent slot at t = 0, and the 1 with an active slot at t = 1. While active slots are still not affected by this attack, the silent slots are targeted more efficiently: the energy budget previously used to jam one frequency only is now split over F different frequencies, and eventually the silent slot is jammed In Figure 8 , frequency f 0 , where sender and receiver are aligned, is jammed.
In order to prove that SiG can be easily adapted to be resilient against such an attack, in the following we first provide more details about the energy detection function E(t, f ); later, we show how the adversary, in order to compromise one silent slot, can be required to jam an arbitrary long fraction of the time slot, reducing its ability to swipe over multiple frequencies.
Let us assume that the time slot lasts for δ ms and that it is further divided into K periods, each one lasting for η = δ/K ms. Let us also assume that the receiver retrieves the bits sent from the sender according to the following channel energy estimation:
where e is the energy estimated over the frequency f during the time slot t by means of e = E(t, f ) and τ is the threshold already introduced in Section 3.1, that is, the receiver sensitivity. Moreover, let us assume that the received signal y(t) spans between y m and y M (y M > y m ), where y M is a saturation value that can be arbitrarily set by the receiver, and y m is such that the energy e m associated with the received signal (during the time slot) is sufficient to allow the correct reception of the signal itself, that is: PROOF. In order to jam as many frequencies as possible, the adversary should maximize the injected energy per slot, so as to minimize the time spent on that slot. Let K J ≤ K be the number of times for which the adversary transmits the jamming signal y J (t) in the current time slot. Recalling that the receiver saturates the received (jamming) signal to y M , it yields:
To effectively jam a silent slot, it should be verified e J ≥ e m , that is:
Now, observing that the number of frequencies that can be jammed by the adversary by hopping over the radio spectrum sums up to
, substituting e m = Kηy 2 m to this equation, it yields:
Lemma 1 shows that the adversary cannot effectively jam an arbitrary large number of frequencies by quickly hopping among them: in fact, the adversary is lower bounded on the time it has to spend to effectively jam a target frequency; therefore it is upper bounded on the number of frequencies it can effectively jam per time slot. On one extreme of the spectrum, if the receiver sets y M < √ 2y m , from Equation (1) we obtain B J ≤ 1; that is, the adversary can jam just one frequency per time period. On the other extreme of the spectrum, if the receiver sets y M ≥ √ F y m the adversary is able to jam all the available frequencies, disrupting the communication ( for y M = √ F y m we have B J ≤ F).
In the following, to take into account this range of possibility while decoupling from the underlying complexity, we assume that the adversary is able to jam A over the F available frequencies.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In the following, we present the performance analysis of the SiG protocol. We start our analysis from a theoretical point of view providing a closed formula for the probability that R, having derived m from the received message m ec , correctly recovers the message m originally sent by T (we will refer to this probability as P(m = m)). Such a probability will be dependent on the (proactive) jamming probability p J . We will assume, coherently with our adversary model, that the reactive capabilities of the jammer allow it to jam all the transmissions of T ; all the 1s of message m thus are correctly received (see Section 3.2). Subsequently, we show and discuss the results of an extensive simulation campaign that confirms our theoretical findings and the quality and viability of our proposal. Figure 9 recaps our communication reference model for the theoretical analysis. In particular, we recall that each bit of the message m, that is, m i , is encoded into a codeword 9:18 R. Di Pietro and G. Oligeri 
Theoretical Analysis
where δ(M i , M i ) is the asymmetric distance computed between M i and M i , that is, the number of 0s belonging to M i that change their value to 1 in the bit-string M i . We recall that, according to our communication model justified in previous sections and synthesized in Figure 9 , the only possible bit crossover is 0 → 1, while 1 → 0 is not possible. Therefore, since the frequencies jammed by a proactive jammer in any time slot are independent from the frequencies jammed in other time slots, Equation (2) can be rewritten as:
The probability of experiencing exactly one crossover 0 → 1 at a given time slot for the codeword M i is given by the probability p J that J successfully jams exactly that time slot (out of the n silent slots) belonging to the codeword M i . Therefore, the probability having the codeword M i correctly decoded at the receiver, yields:
Further, the probability of correctly delivering the bit string m ec , that is, P(m ec = m ec ), can be computed as:
Assuming the message m enjoys a uniform distribution of zeros and ones (similar considerations expressed in Footnote 1 do support this assumption) and recalling that, as justified in Section 5.2, P(M i = M i | m i = 1) = 1 (no crossovers 1 → 0 occur), this equation can be rewritten as:
The probability that R could recover an L m bits-long message m sent by T and encoded with an ECC code C n , yields:
Therefore, if we set to the upper bound on the probability for J to successfully jam the message m (i.e., P(m = m) ≤ ), the maximum jamming probability p J the protocol Fig. 10 . Message delivery probability (P(m = m )) with the SiG protocol: the message length is L m = 128 bits, while the jamming probability has been obtained by fixing F = 124 and varying A in [0, . . . , 123] . We consider both simulated (error bars) and theoretical (curves) results for different codeword lengths, that is, n ∈ {8, 16, 32}. is resilient to can be computed as:
Simulation Results
We consider the reference scenario of Figure 9 , and the transmission of a message m of length L m = 128 bits. Figure 10 shows both theoretical and simulated results of the SiG protocol. Error bars show the quantile 5, 50, and 95 of 10, 000 simulated transmissions of the message m. For each configuration, we derived the jamming probability p J by setting the number of available frequencies to the constant F = 124, while we varied the number of jammed frequencies A from 0 to 123. Moreover, we considered three different codeword lengths, that is, n ∈ {8, 16, 32}. Finally, the pointed curves represent the theoretical predictions provided by Equation (4). Table II shows the bounds on p J fixing = 0.99 and varying n ∈ {8, 16, 32}; recalling Equation (5), we can observe in Figure 10 how the bounds perfectly fit the simulated results. For instance, note that SiG is able to deliver a 128 bit string with probability at least 99% (P(m = m ) ≥ 1 − ), using a codeword length of n = 16 in the presence of a jammer J , which proactively jams 55% of the available frequencies. Finally, we stress that our results are obtained assuming that the jamming is performed successfully on all the active communications and on a subset ( p J = A F ) of the silent radio channels. Fig. 11 . Message delivery probability (P(m = m )) with the SiG protocol: the message length spans in the range L m ∈ {128, 256, 512} bits, while the jamming probability has been obtained by fixing F = 124 and varying A in [0, . . . , 123] . We consider both simulated (error bars) and theoretical (curves) results for a fixed codeword length n = 16.
Varying the message length L m . Figure 11 shows both theoretical and simulated results of the SiG protocol varying the message length L m ∈ {128, 256, 512}. We fixed the codeword length to n = 16, and set the jamming probability by fixing the number of available frequencies to F = 124, while we varied the number of jammed frequencies A from 0 to 123. Error bars show the quantile 5, 50, and 95 of 10, 000 simulated transmissions of the message m, while the curves are obtained by plotting Equation (4). Recalling Equation (5), we observe that the bounds in order to guarantee a message delivery with at least 99% probability (P(m = m ) ≥ 1 − ), are given by p J ≤ p J = {0.55, 0.53, 0.51} for a message of L m = {128, 256, 512} bits, respectively, and a codeword length n = 16.
Varying the threshold . Finally, we consider how the successful message jamming probability = P(m = m ) affects the performance of the SiG protocol. Equation (4) can be rewritten as function of the codeword length, yielding: Figure 12 shows Equation (6) varying p J for different values of the threshold ∈ {10 −2 , 10 −4 , 10 −6 }, with a message length L m = 128 bits. For instance, assuming a proactive jamming probability p J = A F = 0.8, we observe that a codeword length n ≥ 80 assures a message delivery probability of 1 − , where = 10 −6 .
Time to Deliver a Message
In the previous sections, we considered a powerful adversary that was able to reactively jam all the transmissions of the radio spectrum (Section 3.2). Although we proved SiG to be robust against such an adversary, achieving full-spectrum jamming might be impractical even for the most powerful jammer. Therefore, in this section we consider a weaker but more realistic adversary, referred to as depleted adversary, able to jam just A out of the F available frequencies for each of the time slots, without distinction between silent or active slots. Choosing the codeword length (n) as a function of the probability of jamming ( p J ). We fixed the message length L m = 128 bits and considered different values for the threshold ∈ {10 −2 , 10 −4 , 10 −6 }. Fig. 13 . Number of slots needed to deliver a message in the presence of both a powerful and a depleted adversary. The error bars depict the quantile 5, 50, and 95 associated with the number of slots needed to deliver the message when the jamming probability spans between 3 * 10 −2 and 0.97. Figure 13 shows the error bars associated with the quantile 5, 50, and 95 computed over the number of slots needed to deliver a message for both the powerful and the depleted adversary. We consider a message length L m = 128 bits, a codeword length n = 16 and F = 124 frequencies.
In the presence of the powerful adversary, SiG delivers the message with L m * n = 2048 time slots when the probability of jamming is less than p J < 0.6 as also confirmed by Figure 10 . Conversely, in the presence of the depleted adversary that jams only A out of F frequencies, SiG delivers the message with the first active communication and therefore the performance is dramatically better. Finally, we observe that the median value of the number of slots needed to deliver a message in the presence of a depleted adversary is 17: this is due to the fact that when the first bit to deliver is 0 (half of the cases), on average n = 16 time slots are needed before the first active communication is performed and the message is delivered. [Cassola et al. 2013 ] × SiG -this paper
COMPARISON WITH OTHER SOLUTIONS
In this section, we compare our solution with other anti-jamming techniques: Table III compares SiG with other recent works with respect to the adversarial model considered in this article. First, we recall that, to the best of our knowledge, the adversary considered in this work (J ) is the most powerful ever considered in the literature (see Section 3.2). Standard techniques [Liu et al. 2011; Popper et al. 2010 ] assume a "pure" proactive adversary, thus cannot deal with J . In fact, both TDBS [Liu et al. 2011] and UFH-UDSSS [Popper et al. 2010 ] are useless against our reactive jammer, which promptly interferes with the transmitted message. In particular, TDBS changes the transmission frequency of the peers according to a preloaded sequence; nevertheless, the simple frequency hopping is useless against J , which reactively jams the transmitted message as soon as it appears on the channel. Similarly, UFH-UDSSS combines both uncoordinated frequency hopping and uncoordinated direct spread spectrum: although this approach does not need a preshared secret between the peers, a reactive adversary like J disrupts the communications and prevents message delivery.
A few solutions have been proposed in order to mitigate the effects of a reactive adversary. The solution presented by introduces a novel technique to detect a reactive jammer and raises a jamming suspicion alarm. Strasser et al. leverage the combination of bit errors and RSS readings in order to infer on the current presence of a jamming signal. Although this solution is optimal for the protection of a reactive alarm system, it does not solve the problem of communicating in the presence of a reactive jammer. A similar solution is proposed by Xuan et al. [2012] : nodes that trigger the reactive jammer are switched off and the messages are routed in order to avoid the nodes close to the jammers. This solution involves mainly the identification of the jammers' position and does not deal directly with the jamming attack, yet Xuan et al. assume that the jammed area is a subset of the network deployment, therefore the proposed solution is not effective against a J that can jam the whole network. An interesting solution that directly deals with reactive jamming is BitTrickle [Liu and Ning 2012] . The solution leverages the delay experienced by a jammer to switch between the sensing and the jamming phase in order to correctly deliver a few bits per packet. Although Liu and Ning assume a reactive jammer with unlimited spectrum coverage and transmission power, the proposed solution is not resilient against our adversarial model. In our adversarial model, J experiences a theoretically zero delay to switch between sensing and jamming.
A MAC level solution is proposed by Richa et al. [2012] , who design a protocol that guarantees fair channel access probabilities among nodes in the presence of a bounded reactive adversary that can indeed jam (1 − ) portion of the time slots. Therefore, even AntiJam [Richa et al. 2012 ] cannot deal with the unlimited reactive jamming characteristics of J .
The solution presented by Vo-Huu et al. [2013] is the only one that can be adopted in order to deal with a combined proactive and reactive adversary. The solution is mainly based on a novel mechanical beam-forming design with a fast auto-configuration algorithm, that is, the geometry of a two-element antenna is controlled by an algorithm in order to obtain a destructive interference for the received jamming signal. Nevertheless, such an approach cannot deal with multiple deployed adversaries or even against a single mobile adversary: antenna cancellation is achieved with respect to only a specific (static) adversarial position.
Finally, the solution proposed by Cassola et al. [2013] improves the performance of Popper et al. [2010] , but still adopts spread spectrum techniques that are useless against the reactive jammer presented in this work.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we have introduced a powerful (yet realistic) jammer model that reduces to zero the communication bandwidth between two communicating parties, even when state-of-the-art anti-jamming solutions are adopted. To cope with this novel adversary model, we have introduced a brand new communication protocol: Silence is Golden (SiG). Implementing a tunable, asymmetric communication channel between communicating parties, SiG is able to restore an effective bandwidth between them. Moreover, when SiG is used in a scenario in which the adversary can actively jam just a subset of all the available frequencies, performance is enhanced. We have provided a thorough analysis of the SiG protocol, as well as the results of an extensive simulation campaign that support our theoretical findings and show both the quality and the viability of the SiG protocol.
